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ARE INSTITUTIONS THE ANSWER? MITIGATING     
SECTARIAN PROTEST IN DIVIDED NATIONS 
 
By Matthew P. Arsenault 
Department of Political Science 
College of Arts and Sciences 
 
Abstract. Ethnic violence has increased exponentially in the decades fol-
lowing World War II.  As such, it is imperative that cures for the unique ills 
found in divided societies be discovered.  This article seeks to quantitatively 
investigate the effici ency of formal political institutions in curbing ethni-
cally-based violent protest in divided societies.  As such, the dependent vari-
able is the level of violent protest, while the independent variables include: a 
parliamentary system of government, a proportional representation electoral  
system, and a federated system. It is my contention that such institutions will 
significantly lessen incidents of ethnically-motivated violent protest. In ad-
dition, this article concludes with suggestions for further research in examin-
ing institutional structures and ethnic conflict.   
The third wave of democratization has ushered in a global movement toward de-
mocracy and the creation of newly independent states.  However, the transitions to 
democracy have not always been peaceful. For all its excitement and reported bene-
fits, this wave of democratization has coincided with an increase in ethnic conflict, 
particularly in the developing world (Gurr 1993).  In order to quell the increase in 
sectarian violence it  is necessary to explore which political institutions moderate vio-
lent protest in multi-ethnic societies.  By moderating violent protest, it  is hoped that 
more wide-ranging ethnic violence will be prevented. 
In all societies, institutions serve as structures which govern human interactions 
and behavior.  Douglass North defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a soci-
ety or, more formally, [institutions as] the humanly devised constraints that shape hu-
man interaction” (2004: 3).  There are few societies that are more in need of strong 
institutional structures to ensure stability than those with numerous conflicting ethnic 
groups.  Only through the implementation of specifically designed political institu-
tional structures can a state limit violence between ethnicities. 
Two paradigms stand at the fore of institutional design in multi-ethnic societies: 
the consociational and majoritarian models of democracy.  The consociational model 
contends that, in divided societies, a system of consensus between actors is para-
mount in the policy-making process. The institutions created in a consociational de-
mocracy recognize ethnic divisions as autonomous entities and make those cleavages 
“the basis for rule in decision making, territorial division of power, and public poli-
cies” (Caspersen 2004: 570).  Some political institutions found in the consociational 
model include a power-sharing government, a proportional representation system, and 
some degree of federalism. 
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On the other side of the spectrum, the majoritarian model is closely linked with the 
Anglo-American, or Westminster model, of democracy. The majoritarian model 
represents a system in which political competition is based upon “electorally competi-
tive elites organized into a governing party and a loyal opposition with the major par-
ties alternating over time” (Sterling 1978: 303). Unlike consociationalism, the majori-
tarian paradigm argues that political elites will not always agree to cooperate.  As 
such, majoritarianism contends that institutions need to be created to ensure modera-
tion and multi-ethnicity among factions (Horowitz 2004).  Political institutions found 
commonly in a majoritarian model include a unitary government, single-member dis-
trict electoral systems, and alternating opposition rule over time. 
Exploring the effectiveness of institutional structures in divided societies provides 
democracy scholars with a theoretical basis with which to explore possible solutions 
to the problems faced by emerging democracies. 
Although proven successful in many cases, predominantly in the developed world, 
majoritarian systems in deeply divided and developing societies may lead to ethnic or 
cultural conflict (Daalder 1974).  By studying varying institutional solutions to sectar-
ian problems, the democracy theorist  is better able to prescribe remedies to real-world 
conflicts and make the new wave of democratization more stable and equitable. 
Two claims emerge from the consociational and majoritarian democracy para-
digms.  First , the consociational institutions of power-sharing government, minority 
veto, proportional electoral system, and ethnic autonomy lead to lower levels of vio-
lent ethnic protest in pluralistic societies.  By creating a system in which ethnic 
groups have access to the political process, violence becomes a less acceptable solu-
tion to ethnic troubles. Second, majoritarian institutions, which demand a cross-
cutting of ethnic cleavages, lead to multi-ethnic moderation and encourage coopera-
tion in divided societies, thus lessening levels of violent ethnic protest.  Of these two 
claims, I argue that the consociational paradigm serves as better model for conflict 
moderation in divided societies and limits incidents of violent ethnic protest. 
The literature addressing political institutions in multi-cultural societies is vast but 
can be traced to Arend Lijphart’s The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and De-
mocracy in the Netherlands (1968).  Here Lijphart begins to structure his model of 
consociational democracy by studying the institutions that serve to maintain political 
stability in an ethnically divided Netherlands.  Lijphart builds upon “a familiar propo-
sition in pluralist  theory: that social cleavages are moderated if different cleavages cut 
across one another, but become loaded with conflict if they cumulatively reinforce 
one another” (Daalder 1974: 606).  Lijphart argues that cooperation between the 
cleavage group elites can effectively serve as horizontal bridges between factions, 
thus decreasing the potential for violent conflict. 
Lijphart argued that a number of criteria must be met for consociational democ-
racy to be successful.  First , distinct lines of cleavage must exist.  Rather than at-
tempting to erase deeply seated ethnic division, consociational theorists see the divi-
sions as an ingrained aspect of societies and must be addressed as such. Second, the 
masses must favor a grand coalition maintaining a balance of power between factions.  
It is here that Lijphart begins to frame his ideas on the importance of elite coopera-
tion.   
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Lijphart writes: 
 
[a] key requirement is that the leaders of the sel f-contained blocks must be 
particularly convinced of the desirability of preserving the system. And they 
must be willing and capable of bridging the gaps between the mutually iso-
lated blocs and resolving serious disputes in a largely nonconsensual con-
text. (1968: 103-4). 
 
Lastly, a moderate degree of nationalism must exist to encourage cooperation be-
tween factions, with a limited amount of stress on the system as a whole (Hudson 
1976).  A sense of nationalism is necessary to decrease the reliance on ethnic identity 
and depoliticize ethnicity, which, in turn, makes groups more tolerant of differing 
groups and lends stability and legitimacy to the state government.  With a more unify-
ing identity, fewer incidents of violent protest are apt to occur. 
Eric Nordlinger’s Conflict Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies (1972) builds 
on Lijphart’s description of the consociational paradigm and provides a systematic 
approach to conflict resolution. Nordlinger establishes six practices used to control 
conflict between cleavage groups that would subsequently decrease incidents of vio-
lent protest in divided societies: the establishment of a stable coalition government, 
proportional electoral systems, a sense of depoliticization, minority veto, a compro-
mise between groups, and concessions between stronger cleavage groups toward the 
weaker (Hudson 1976; Lijphart 1977).  These institutions may grant ethnic groups a 
greater and more efficient say in the political process which, in turn, would make vio-
lent protest an unattractive alternative. 
During the late seventies, a number of important review articles appeared that 
called for “greater attention to be paid to interethnic bargaining, compromise, balanc-
ing, reciprocity and cooperation as techniques for maintaining the stability and integ-
rity of plural societies” in the developing world (Lustic 1979: 329).  In Democracy in 
Plural Societies, Lijphart steps away from continental Europe and addresses the prob-
lems of consociational systems in the developing world.  Influenced by Sir Arthur 
Lewis’ study of thirteen African states, Lijphart argues that majoritarian or competi-
tive systems, if enacted in the developing world, potentially will lead to authoritarian 
regimes which, in turn, may promote ethnic patronage and paternalistic government 
(1977: 144).  Reiterating the point, Robert Dahl writes, “obviously any system is in 
peril if it  becomes polarized into several highly antagonistic groups.  Confronted by 
severe polarization, competitive regimes are prone to collapse, to a coup d’etat, (or) 
to civil war” (1971: 105). 
Dahl, Lewis, and Lijphart do not argue that democracy is a poor fit in divided 
states but, rather, that the majoritarian model of democracy fits poorly.  Lijphart 
quotes Lewis at length and the passage will add clarity here: 
 
Britain and France are class societies, and thei r institutions and conventions 
are designed to cope with this fact.  West Africa is not a class society; its 
problem is that it is a plural society.  What is good for a class society is bad 
for a plural society.  Hence to create good political institutions in West Af-
rica one has to think of thei r problem through the foundations up. (1977: 
145).  
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Consociation theorists build upon the idea of elite cooperation.  According to the 
consociational model, ethnic group elites understand the dangers posed if ethnic con-
flict continues.  As such, it is hoped that the various sectarian leaders will choose to 
cooperate and adhere to institutional structures that recognize ethnic divisions and 
promote stability.  In turn, under a system which encourages elite cooperation, politi-
cal elites are less likely to encourage members of their ethnic groups to participate in 
violent protest. 
It  becomes rational for the leadership of ethnic groups to enter such institutions, as 
the long-term benefits outweigh the short-term gains brought through competition. As 
such, the institutions, once in place, will encourage an environment in which violent 
protest is viewed as costly and negative. 
In reviewing the consociational theoretical literature, Hans Daalder provides a suc-
cinct description of the consociational model’s emphasis on elite cooperation.  Daal-
der writes, “strongly divided societies can be stabilized by a conscious effort on the 
part of political elites, provided they deliberately seek to counteract the immobilizing 
and destabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation” (1974: 607).  Indeed, a major 
catalyst for cultural fragmentation is unmitigated violent political protest. In order for 
elite cooperation to be successful, elites must forgo the competition espoused by the 
Anglo-American model of democracy and instead form a union of ethnic elites.  For 
this leadership union to be successful, “ they [the elites] must rely instead on forms of 
proportional representation in which no single actor acquires a mandate” (1974: 607). 
In addition to a proportional representation system, the governing regime must 
grant a level of autonomy to the ethnic groups composing the union. By granting free-
doms to the cleavage groups, and imposing the will of the greater union only when 
doing so is in the best interest of all parties concerned, ethnic conflict and political 
struggle can be kept to a minimum.  In discussing the role of federalism as autonomy, 
Fukuyama writes, “ in politics, federalism (as a form of autonomy) means that govern-
ment is closer and more visible to the people it  is meant to serve, which theoretically 
should increase accountability and therefore legitimacy and quality of democ-
racy” (2004: 70).  As the quality and legitimacy of the political system increases, the 
levels of disenchantment with the system will fall, thus lessening incidents of violent 
ethnic protest.  Aside from federalism, institutions such as mutual veto and unanimity 
serve to ensure the autonomy necessary to promote a decline in violent ethnic protest. 
Nevertheless, many opponents of the consociational model claim that litt le chance 
of consensus exists in a deeply divided society.  Barry Weingast offers three reasons 
why “universalistic limits on government, applying to members of all ethnic groups 
are difficult  to sustain” (1997: 256). First , the values of the different cleavage groups 
are often at odds, making accommodation difficult.  Second, one group may benefit 
from exploiting another.  As such, a collective action problem ensues.  Lastly, even if 
all conflicting groups desire an end to conflict, the actual establishment of a solution 
palatable to all parties is difficult  at  best (1997: 256-7). 
Horowitz’ integrative mode addresses stability in multi-cultural societies and miti-
gates many of Weingast’s concerns.  A derivative of the Anglo-American democratic 
model, integrativism proposes the adoption of institutions that promote competition 
and majority rule in the hopes of overcoming the deep conflicts that are present in 
cleavage societies. 
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Unlike the consociational model, which adheres to the belief that ethnic elites see 
accommodation as a way to maximize their personal interests and the interests of their 
particular ethnic group, integrativism views accommodation as complex at best.  
Horowitz writes: 
 
Policy makers are participants in their societies.  As such, they may entertain 
hostile feelings toward members of other groups.  If not, they may still have 
a view of intergroup relations that sees ethnic conflict as necessary to ad-
vancement of the interests of their group.  Even if political leaders do not 
hold such views, they may nonetheless benefit, politically or materially, 
from continuation of the conflict and be loath to pursue policies of ameliora-
tion. (2004: 564).     
 
The integrative model contends that, in order to overcome the self-interested moti-
vations of political elites, a preferential electoral system needs to be created “ in which 
a candidate’s election depends on attracting votes from outside his or her ethnic 
group” (Caspersen 2004: 571).  As such, the integrative approach puts a great value 
on elections, while the consociational model places more emphasis on the less public  
negotiations between ethnic group elites. 
Aside from Horowitz’s crit ique of the ability of ethnic elites to cooperate, he ar-
gues that the consociational model, although effective in small European nations, has 
litt le practicality in the developing world.  Horowitz writes: 
 
There are supra-segmental sentiments that tie group members to the Swiss 
or the Dutch nation in a way that group members are not tied to an inclusive 
conception of the Lebanese, Malaysian, or Ugandan nation.  The European 
conflicts are thus less ascriptive in character, less severe in intensity, less 
exclusive in their command of the loyalty of participants, and less preemp-
tive of other forms of conflict. (2004: 572). 
 
As the integrative and consociational paradigms serve as templates not only for 
conflict resolution but establishing governance structures in real-world multi-ethnic 
societies, it is imperative to test both models in order to discover the relative effec-
tiveness of these prescribed institutions. 
In this study, I argue that the consociational paradigm serves as superior model for 
limiting the frequency of violent ethnic protest.  I analyze the relationship between 
consociational institutions and sectarian protest.  I hypothesize that nations governed 
by consociational institutions are likely to experience fewer incidents of violent ethnic 
protest than their majoritarian counterparts. 
The data for this project are drawn from the Minorities at Risk Project. The study 
encompasses 233 politically active communal groups in 93 countries each organized 
by a host of variables and categories.  Unfortunately, the Minorities at Risk Project 
does not test the role of particular political institutions on levels of ethnic violence.  
However, expanding upon Gurr’s project, Saideman et al. attempt a large-N, pooled-
time series analysis for the years 1985 through 1998, seeking to examine the impacts 
of political institutions on levels of ethnic conflict. 
Saideman et al. draw their dependent variables from Gurr’s project but have cre-
The Hilltop Review, Fall 2009  
Matthew P. Arsenault            44 
   
 
ated their own explanatory variables.  One dependent variable was drawn from the 
Saideman piece, levels of violent protest, and draws the explanatory variables, elec-
toral system, federalism, and presidential versus parliamentary regime, adapted from 
the Minorities at Risk Project. 
As the level of analysis of the Saideman project is that of individual ethnic groups 
and the level of analysis for this study is the state, the relevant data from the Saide-
man dataset were aggregated to the national level.  In aggregating the dataset, I have 
collapsed the Saideman dataset to average the levels of violent protest of all ethnic 
groups in a particular nation.  In doing so, the data now will represent a total level of 
ethnic violence in a particular state rather than levels illustrated by particular groups.   
By aggregating the dependent variable, we are better able to make assumptions re-
garding the levels of violent protest in nations at large.  Table 3 illustrates the coding 
for the dependent variable. 
Three specific political institutions will be used to represent the consociational 
paradigm and subsequently serve as the independent variables: a proportional repre-
sentation electoral system, federalism, and a parliamentary legislative system.  Each 
is binary so as to allow a clear differentiation between impact of consociational and 
majoritarian institutions on levels of violent ethnic protest. 
 
Table 3:  Coding for Dependent Variable Violent Protest 
 
Violent Protest 
None Reported    0 
Political Banditry, Sporadic Terrorism 1 
Campaigns of Terrorism   2 
Local Rebellions    3 
Small-scale Guerilla Activity  4 
Intermediat e Guerilla Activity  5 
Large-scal e Guerrilla Activity  6 
Protracted Civil War   7 
No Basis for Judgment   99 
 
Source: Saideman et al., 2002. 
 
First, I test the levels of violent protest as a function of the electoral system.    A 
proportional representation system alleviates the polarizing outcomes of a majori-
tarian system, thus allowing greater participation among marginalized groups.  With 
greater access to political power, groups are less likely to resort to violent protest in 
order to voice their grievances. In addition, a proportional representation system is 
conducive to a power-sharing government.  Saideman et al. write:  
 
We propose that plurality systems increase group insecurity, because politi-
cal change can be quite dramatic, and exclusion often results.  If groups can-
not block objectionable policies, then they may have to engage in either pro-
test or violence to have influence.  In a PR system, on the other hand, coali-
tions can change, but ethnic groups may gain representation and could play 
a significant role either as a coalition partner or in opposition to the govern-
ment. (111).  
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I hypothesize that states with a proportional electoral system will experience fewer 
incidents of violent ethnic protest than those without a PR electoral system.  As such, 
I expect a negative coefficient will exist  between the independent variable and the 
electoral systems. 
I also examine the levels of violent ethnic protest as a function of federalism.  The 
consociational model argues that a degree of ethnic autonomy is useful in promoting 
stability and moderating ethnic grievances.  Federalism can be used to ensure a cer-
tain level of autonomy.  Lijphart writes, “[The federal] approach is not to abolish or 
weaken segmental cleavages but to recognize them explicitly and to turn the segments 
into constructive elements of stable democracy” (1977: 42). As such, federalism can 
be conducive to the creation of a power-sharing government, one in which all groups 
are able to participate in the political process. 
Aside from access to the political process, federalism decentralizes the state, 
bringing the state closer to those it  is created to represent.  In doing so, the state gains 
legitimacy (Fukuyama 2004).  With an increase in legitimacy, groups are less likely 
to pursue violent ways to voice their grievances. Relying on Saideman et al., I created 
a binary variable to represent federalist  structures in a given state. 
I hypothesize that a system with federal aspects will have fewer examples of vio-
lent ethnic protest.  If ethnic groups are granted rights over their own lives, the costs 
of violent protest will be great compared to the costs of violent protest in a non-
federated system.  As such, I expect a negative relationship between the federal vari-
able and the dependent variables. 
The final independent variable examines the role of parliamentary and presidential 
political systems on levels of violent ethnic protest.  Saideman et al. argue that presi-
dential systems are more effective in promoting stability and limiting conflict.  They 
contend that “ethnic groups are more insecure, and thus more likely to engage in vio-
lence and preemption, when they cannot block policies that might hurt them.  The 
division of powers between president and legislature allows each to serve as a check 
on the other, even when the same party dominates both branches” (110). 
I take issue with this hypothesis, arguing instead that a parliamentary system pre-
empts levels of protest by granting greater political participation and representation to 
ethnic groups.  In addition, the coalitional nature of a parliamentary system is condu-
cive to a power-sharing government which will, in turn, limit ethnic strife and violent 
ethnically- motivated protest.  I expect to discover a negative coefficient between the 
parliamentary/presidential variable and the dependent variables.  
In order to test the relationship between consociational institutions and levels of 
ethnic protest, I subjected the model to a Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV)  
regression.  This estimator was used to address the unique aspects of panel data and 
this model in particular.  The LSDV regression was used with robust standard errors 
to address issues of heteroskedasticity.  The results of the regression examine the im-
pact of consociational institutions on levels of nonviolent protest.  Table 8 illustrates 
the results. 
Substantively, the table is quite revealing.  Both variables representing federalism 
and proportional representation lack statistical significance. The lack of significance 
for these variables implies that real-world assumptions cannot be made based upon 
the relationships of these variables and levels of violent protest.  However, parliamen-
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tarianism plays a significant role in levels of violent protest.  The data show that a 
state with a parliamentary system is apt to score .332 points higher on the scale of 
violent protest than its majoritarian counterparts.  As such, these data suggest that a 
state with a parliamentary system is likely to have more frequent occurrences of vio-
lent ethnic protest that its presidential counterparts.  This finding supports the Saide-
man hypothesis that presidential systems are more apt to promote stability and miti-
gate ethnic conflict. 
 
Table 8: Violent Ethnic Protest as a Function of Federal, Parliamentary, 
and Proportional Systems 
 
LSDV Regression Violent Protest 
 
Federal    0.108 
   (0.116) 
 
Parliamentary   0.332** 
   (0.142)** 
  
PR System  -0.366 
   0.340 
 
CONS   -1.28 
   1.54 
 
Notes: 
**Designates p > 0.05; 
Standard Error in Parentheses; 
N = 962; 
Estimates Obtained by STATA 9.0. 
 
Although the parliamentary variable proved significant, the fact that other vari-
ables did not leads to a curious puzzle.  Do political systems matter in curbing ethnic 
violence?  What other variables may mitigate sectarian conflict?  In short, this article 
has illustrated that the design of macro-political institutions is not the sole, and per-
haps not the best, approach to curbing ethnic violence.  Other avenues of research 
must be pursued.  One promising path lies in analyzing the impact of informal institu-
tions on ethnic conflict mitigation.  This could be done through an examination of the 
civil society structures in divided societies, and particularly the impact of non-
governmental organizations in developing the infrastructure to implement cross-
cutting cleavages.  Perhaps the best approach to better understanding ethnic conflict is 
by moving from a macro- to a micro-level of analysis. Researchers can conduct cost-
benefit analyses of various ethnic conflict prevention projects across nations. Through 
a more “thick” analysis of the true happenings on the ground, best-practice ap-
proaches can be studied, evaluated, and disseminated to those operating within di-
vided states, and a more efficient system can be adopted.  
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